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T his conceptual and historical analysis of paradigmatic social 
policy experiences in the region reveals some fundamental landmarks 
in the evolution of the link between selective anti-poverty policies and 
social sector policies. These landmarks are associated with major 
changes in targeting policies and with a number of universal social 
policy reforms. Special attention is given to the redistribution-with-growth 
approach; subsequent reductionist targeting proposals, which have 
undergone shifts in conceptual and effective terms over the last two 
decades; and the concern for interaction with social sectors displayed 
by some present-day conditional transfer programmes, which stand out 
in the region because of their scale. Two related trends observed in 
fields that go beyond the effort to combat poverty are also analysed: 
the reductionist social risk management proposal and, in the opposite 
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This study addresses the link between selective anti-
poverty policies, on the one hand, and social sector 
policies and their institutional implications from both 
a conceptual and a historical standpoint, on the other. 
It shows how this link has been conditioned by the 
different orientations of targeting policies and by 
relevant conceptual perspectives in fashion at one time 
or another. As a result of these factors, the various 
phases of these policies have been subject, to some 
extent, to the built-in obsolescence of intellectual 
or political fashions, which, in the long run, reveal 
unforeseen limitations and ultimately lead to the 
reformulation of policies and their objectives. Likewise, 
some reforms of universal social policies1 have also 
conditioned the evolution of targeting policies.
This study considers four landmarks in the evolution 
of selective policies which have had repercussions on 
this relationship. First of all, it analyses targeting within 
the redistribution-with-growth approach. It then looks at 
the subsequent reductionist targeting proposals, taking 
account of their shifts in both conceptual and effective 
terms over the last two decades. The discussion then 
turns to the concern for interaction with the sector level 
displayed by some present-day conditional transfer 
programmes, which stand out in the region because 
of their scale. Finally, it deals with selective policies 
which, although in some cases they can be included 
as part of broader anti-poverty policies, generally go 
beyond them because of the nature of their benefits 
and objectives. In the analysis of these topics, thorough 
attention is given to some aspects of programmes 
and experiences which have been paradigmatic in the 
region, many of which are to be found in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Some other experiences in 
the region are touched upon more briefly.
 A preliminary version of this article was published in Sojo 
(2007). The author wishes to thank Lourdes Colinas for her efficient 
help in collecting some of the information on conditional transfer 
programmes.
1 The principle of universality on which such policies are based 
establishes the levels of protection that society can guarantee to all 
persons as citizens, independently of their socio-economic status or 
their ability to pay. In this latter respect, this principle cannot be 
separated from that of solidarity, whereby the system of rights and 
benefits is financed by the members of society through differential 





In view of the aims of this study, past and present 
welfare policies of a traditional nature will not be taken 
into account because, as their primary objective is to 
cultivate groups of clients in order to gain their political 
support, taking only a short-term view, they often have 
no solid links with universal social sectors or operate 
in relative isolation from them. As a consequence of 
these feeble links, generally speaking, the execution 
of these policies is not associated with the dismantling 
of any universal programmes with which they might 
compete.
In the history of social policy, the weaker formal 
social policy institutions have been and the more deeply 
rooted clientage has become as the accepted form 
of political mediation, the greater the prevalence of 
traditional welfare programmes.2 These programmes 
have covered a wide range of benefits, such as income 
transfers, food programmes and subsidies relating to 
health, housing and other aspects. In view of their high 
2 Nor does clientage seem to be invariably confined to present-day 
programmes with systems for the selection of beneficiaries and 
explicit criteria linked with the sector level. An evaluation of the 
Brazilian Bolsa Escola scholarship programme for schoolchildren 
found that at the more highly politicized municipal levels in Brazil 
there seems to be less concern about ensuring that the conditions 
of eligibility for benefits are satisfied in, for example, education 
programmes. Various regression analyses suggest that some variables 
of a political nature may influence the processes of registration of 
beneficiaries (de Janvry, Finan and others, pp. 21 and 25).
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degree of discretionality and clientage-based approach, 
they are generally marked by the use of beneficiary 
selection procedures which are very fragile because 
of the absence of technically-based selection criteria 
designed to attack poverty at its roots. A typical 
example of this, developed in the heat of the populist 
policies so much in vogue in the region in the twentieth 
century, is the so-called “social works” of Evita Perón, 
which offered considerable benefits in the fields of 
housing and health and made their mentor extremely 
popular among the population of Argentina.
Strictly speaking, we prefer the term “selectivity” 
to “targeting”. As noted in the past, this latter term does 
not fully express the idea of selectivity and is even 
tautological, since all policies —including universal 
social policies designed to get away from the idea of 
targeting— are aimed at some target population.
It should also be borne in mind that targeting 
is a vague, imprecise term (Sojo, 2000), since it is 
used in connection with a wide range of policies and 
programmes, especially programmes designed as safety 
nets for the extremely poor; programmes to relieve the 
effects of income disturbances, such as those set up in 
Argentina at the start of this decade; traditional welfare 
programmes; conditional cash transfer programmes 
within a framework of entitlements and obligations 
(such as the Programa Puente in Chile or the Programa 
Oportunidades in Mexico); and programmes which 
may or may not be linked with social sectors. Recently, 
the concept of “safety ropes” has also appeared in 
connection with insurance-type programmes designed 
to protect vulnerable social sectors, even if they are 
not poor (Pritchett, 2005, pp. 17-19). As the term 
“targeting” has been so widely used, however, it was 
impossible to avoid using it in this study to initiate the 
dialogue, although we have tried to make its meaning 
more explicit in the course of the text.
III
Targeting in the context of
redistribution with growth
In the 1970s, the concept of targeting was associated 
with proposals on redistribution with growth which 
endowed it with certain particular characteristics: the 
focus of the analysis was on the structural causes of 
poverty; targeting was not centred solely on social 
policy; and it was not felt that social policy should be 
confined or reduced to programmes designed exclusively 
for the poor. Such actions were merely seen as part 
of a spectrum of income redistribution policies which 
should modify the concentration of physical and human 
capital in order to give the poor access to skills, physical 
capital, complementary assets, public services and public 
investment. It was felt that targeting in social policy 
should guarantee access to services, eliminate leakage 
to non-target groups, and take account of the fact that 
services such as mother and child care and nutrition 
services were necessary complements to an investment-
oriented strategy (Sojo, 1990, pp. 175-176).3
A wide range of redistribution instruments was 
envisaged: the factors market; ownership and control 
of assets; taxes on personal income and wealth; the 
supply of public consumption goods; goods markets; 
and intervention in technological development. In 
view of the multiple dimensions of the redistributive 
aims of economic policy, different instruments were 
considered (Ahluwalia, in Chenery and others, 1974, 
p. 125). Since targeting was centred on the causes 
of poverty and not just on its symptoms, it also 
extended to assets, insofar as they are determinants 
of income, and aimed to identify different groups 
of poor people who should have access to specific 
assets. Mother and child and nutritional services, for 
their part, were seen as necessary complements to an 
investment-oriented strategy (Ahluwalia and Chenery, 
in Chenery and others, 1974, p. 77). The poor were 
to receive subsidies for public services with a view 
to raising their productivity as well (Rao, in Chenery 
and others, 1974).
Target groups should correspond to a group of 
persons who are not only poor but also relatively 
3 For the proposals made by Ahluwalia and Chenery; Chenery and 
Duloy, and Rao, see Chenery and others (1974).
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homogeneous as regards the effect that a given set of 
policy instruments can have on them (Bell and Duloy, 
in Chenery and others, 1974, p. 127), and leakages 
of benefits from some programmes to beneficiaries 
not specifically defined as such should be eliminated 
(Chenery and Duloy, in Chenery and others, 1974). 
The difficulties inherent in providing more services to 
the poor without reducing them in other sectors were 
acknowledged, however, as was the resistance that the 
latter sectors would put up to losing their privileges 
(Rao, in Chenery and others, 1974).
In institutional terms, the range of areas of 
intervention was very wide and called, in practice, 
for the action and coordination of the various bodies 
involved. The approach to social policy, however, 
which was centred on social sectors, did not envisage 
changing their traditional dynamics, whereby each 
social sector acted in a primarily independent manner, 
without much coordination with the others. As we shall 
see below, the proposals for redistribution with growth, 
which were so clearly oriented towards the causes 
of poverty and its various dimensions, were notably 
weakened in the early 1980s.
IV
Reductionist targeting and its shifts
in conceptual and practical terms
…[reductionist intentions] do not come free of charge. They always form part
of a larger initiative, of some project to completely reform the intellectual picture
as well as our attitude to life…. reduction is never neutral, it is never aimed solely
at simplicity. You may ask: is reduction always aimed at somehow discrediting or
degrading what it reduces?
Mary Midgley4
With the passing of the years, the arguments for 
targeting changed profoundly. These changes came 
to a head in the 1980s, when the targeting approach 
underwent a reduction in conceptual and political terms 
in line with the proposals for social policy reforms 
formulated by some governments and by organizations 
such as the World Bank. This proposal must be 
considered as reductionist5 because it systematically 
identified negative elements of universal programmes 
in order to support the replacement of the principle of 
universality by that of targeting. The latter, presented as 
a general and definitive principle, traced out a simpler 
and more restricted order for social policy: that of being 
subsidiary and restricted to matters of poverty. In line 
with virtues attributed to targeting in terms of efficacy, 
efficiency and equity, both the objectives and the scope 
of social policy were limited to those which, in strict 
terms, could be considered as suitable only for some 
types of targeting.
Thus, reductionism put together a global view of 
social policy which, because of its simplicity, seemed 
attractive during this period of orthodox structural 
adjustment. As experience was certainly to show, 
however, its viability and implementation were very 
complex because of its controversial nature and the 
social exclusion it implied. Against the background 
of proposals to privatize social policies of a universal 
nature that removed the principle of solidarity from 
their f inancing, this school of thought came to 
advocate the dismantling of universal social services 
(which fell out of favour when, as the result of an 
analytical extrapolation, they came to be equated with 
the regressiveness of pension schemes and the like) 
and the concentration of public social spending on 
the most vulnerable groups through so-called targeted 
programmes.
4 From “Reductive megalomania” (Midgley, 1995).
5 In the original version of this article, this footnote dealt with a 
question of Spanish terminology that is not relevant for English-
speaking readers.
115
EVOLUTION OF THE LINK BETWEEN SELECTIVE ANTI-POVERTY POLICIES AND SOCIAL SECTORS POLICIES  •  ANA SOJO
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 1  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 7
It was claimed that, in contrast with the provision 
of universal services, which were criticized as being 
very costly and inefficient, targeting could allow 
governments to reduce poverty more effectively and at 
a lower cost. Franco, for example, put forward targeting 
as a fundamental instrument, postulate and guiding 
principle for social policy, in the place of “general” and 
“traditional” policies, as the latter tended to be costly 
and to have little impact on the most seriously affected 
sectors, as well as having failed to reach the poor. He 
considered that targeting, in contrast, made it possible 
to use public resources more rationally, to attain the 
objectives of social programmes more effectively, to 
use the available resources more efficiently and to 
heighten the effect on the target population; he also 
claimed that it had had a positive impact on the human 
development index attained by Chile in the late 1980s. 
He therefore considered that there should also be an 
increase in the social resources applied in this way 
(Franco, 1990, pp. 184-189; 1996, p. 18).
As regards the social sectors’ morphology, it 
was argued that primary health attention and primary 
education should be strengthened at the expense of the 
other levels. And last but not least, the emphasis on 
social safety nets which were supposed to soften the 
impact of the adjustment programmes shifted interest to 
the symptoms of poverty, relegating to second place the 
question of its causes, which had formed an important 
part of the relevant proposals in the 1970s. In spite of 
the special features of the past evolution of individual 
countries and the special nature of their problems, 
and generally in the absence of backing from accurate 
studies or knowledge (van de Walle, 1995), it was 
assumed that targeting was an efficient, efficacious and 
generally valid tool. The overall proposals for social 
policy were based on the following considerations: 
(Sojo, 1990):
(i)  The need to help solve the fiscal crisis of the State 
through changes in social spending;
(ii)  The need to concentrate public social spending on 
the most vulnerable population groups and limit 
the action of the State in social policy matters. 
The principle of universality in social policy was 
severely questioned and negatively evaluated and, 
for example, the general regressiveness of pension 
systems was extrapolated to social expenditure in 
general. It was proposed that universalist policies 
should be dismantled, to varying degrees;
(iii)  Advocacy of the relative privatization of social 
services, even in the case of targeted programmes. 
In this connection, little importance was attached 
to the problems raised by the private provision of 
services due to market failures (risk selection, for 
example);
(iv)  Conf idence that improved primary income 
distribution and the higher standard of living that 
would result from the trickle-down effect and 
economic reactivation would ensure that those 
outside the target groups would be able to pay to 
use private services.
For conservative circles in Latin America, the 
targeting policies instituted in Chile during the military 
dictatorship became social policy paradigms. It may be 
noted that this conceptual development and experience 
occurred in one of the countries of the region where 
the welfare-State had reached a significant level of 
development up to the early 1970s and had therefore 
required reforms in social sectors, for which targeting 
played an ancillary role. The radical redefinition of the 
rules on the provision and financing of social services 
was possible thanks to the authoritarian regime, which 
lefts its potential opponents, both in political parties 
and among the public suppliers of services and the 
traditional beneficiaries of social policies, in political 
disarray.
As a counterpoint, targeting also occupied an 
important place in another country of the region 
which was conspicuous in the 1980s for its high 
levels of poverty, lags in social investment, feeble 
social policy actions and serious shortcomings in 
social infrastructure, all made worse by the economic 
crisis. This was the case of Bolivia, where targeting 
gained impetus in the context of stabilization and 
macroeconomic adjustment policies which managed 
to bring down hyperinflation. Special mention may 
be made in the case of Bolivia of the role played by 
the Social Emergency Fund (FSE) —later transformed 
into the Social Investment Fund (FIS)— as the prime 
vehicle for targeting. The success achieved in terms of 
macroeconomic stabilization also rubbed off on this 
Fund, which was held up by the World Bank as an 
example for the region as regards targeting.
In other parts of Latin America, reductionism did 
not gain so much ground. In Brazil, for example, there 
was a contrasting upsurge in the universalism of social 
policy which was strongly based on the Constitution 
adopted during the transition to democracy and had 
major repercussions on social policy; suffice it to recall 
the establishment of the Unified Health System (SUS) 
in the reform of the health sector. It is also interesting 
to note that in that country the false dichotomy 
between targeting and universalism polarized the debate 
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on anti-poverty programmes in the 1980s, so that 
selective access was not applied even in the case of 
social assistance programmes. Towards the mid-1990s, 
targeted anti-poverty policies gained legitimacy, but 
they were not viewed as being in opposition to social 
programmes of a universal nature. It has been asserted 
that this “delay” in the application of targeted policies 
made it possible to take advantage of the experience 
of other Latin American countries: a learning process 
which impeded the establishment of programmes that 
were redundant or alien to basic services of a universal 
nature or the installation of social emergency funds 
(Draibe, 2006, p. 143).
Universalism also made progress in Colombia, 
where a complex health reform effort sought universality 
both in coverage of insurance and provision of services, 
as well as competition among insurers and suppliers 
of services, within the framework of a solidary and 
decentralized system whose benefits and obligations 
are established in two systems: the contributory 
system, which is financed with the contributions of 
workers and employers, and the subsidized system. 
The Colombian system has important mechanisms for 
ensuring solidarity, such as the Solidarity and Guarantee 
Fund (FOSYGA).
In Costa Rica, too (a country with long-standing 
universal traditions), there was no retrogression in the 
sense of any form of reductionism in social policy 
matters which adversely affected the resources provided 
for the various social sectors. Indeed, noteworthy efforts 
were made in terms of selective policies designed to 
reduce the digital divide through the introduction of 
education in informatics, beginning with the poorest 
schools, but with a universalist approach aiming to 
expand coverage and with objectives that clearly went 
beyond mere assistentialist attitudes (Sojo, 1993).
It is important to take account of the repercussions 
that the turn towards reductionist targeting had on 
social sector dynamics. The cases of Chile and Bolivia 
are particularly notable because of the considerable 
impact that reductionist proposals had and because 
the experiences of these countries had a good deal of 
influence on anti-poverty policies and social policy in 
general in the rest of the region.
In Chile, during the military dictatorship, targeting 
was functional to the social sector reforms designed 
to do away with solidarity in financing, reduce the 
provision of universal services, oblige the population 
not classified as poor to acquire social services on the 
market, establish demand subsidies so that the poor 
could have access to private social services, and transfer 
functions to the municipalities in the fields of primary 
health services and education. Enormous resources 
were devoted to privatizing the pension system and 
consolidating the institutions of the private health 
insurance system.
As already noted, targeting was accompanied by 
profound changes in the dynamics of the social sectors, 
and the consequences of this combination of events 
were very serious. In the health sector, for example, 
the contraction in expenditure, the cuts in operating 
and investment expenditure and the concentration of 
resources at the primary level, and especially in the 
mother and child health programme and efforts in 
the field of nutrition,6 reflect a perverse relationship 
between targeting and the deterioration of the health 
sector. As the World Bank itself acknowledged, in spite 
of the advanced epidemiological transition achieved by 
Chile, “primary care was expanded at the expense of 
the tertiary level, and the priority given to maternal 
and child care was to the detriment of care for adults 
and the elderly and of related preventive care measures, 
causing imbalances in the health system and reducing 
technical and economic efficiency in the use of inputs” 
(Sojo, 1996, p. 128).
In view of the current positive assessment being 
made of conditional transfer programmes, however, 
mention should be made of a positive feature of the 
targeting practices of that time in Chile. This feature, 
which continues to be of interest and which Pilar Vergara 
described at the time as the most innovative measure 
in the field of the integration of social programmes 
against extreme poverty is the linking of the monetary 
transfer programme called the Unified Family Subsidy 
(SUF) with the mother and child health programme 
and hence with the National Complementary Nutrition 
Programme (PNAC), which had existed since 1954, and 
with children’s school attendance. As well as operating 
as an automatic selection mechanism, this requirement 
had the virtue of promoting the access of the poor to 
the latter nutrition programme. The beneficiaries of 
the SUF also had free access to all medical attention 
provided by the National Health Service: a right which 
the health reforms made at that time had denied to 
children over six (Vergara, 1990, p. 325).
Another characteristic feature of reductionist 
targeting in Chile was the limited scale of the 
programmes, which excluded a very substantial 
6 Fundamentally those of the National Complementary Nutrition 
Programme (Vergara, 1990, pp. 250-251).
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number of people who needed such services and were 
also reflected in services of low monetary value and 
poor quality. To take only one example: in the case of 
the SUF itself, which was originally conceived as an 
integral programme, the real value of transfers went 
down by half between its establishment in 1981 and the 
year 1987. In the case of the PNAC, the restrictions on 
resources led to the abandonment of preventive actions 
in the field of nutrition, to restrictions on the number of 
benefits provided, and to the reduction of the beneficiary 
population, first of all only to under-nourished children, 
then to those in danger of under-nutrition or in a 
situation of extreme poverty, and, from 1985, to children 
with evident symptoms of under-nutrition (Vergara, 
1990, pp. 71 and 96).
In the case of Bolivia, it is worth considering 
the role played by the Social Emergency Fund (later 
converted into the Social Investment Fund), because 
it was held up as a model for the region. When 
social emergency funds were set up, their operational 
independence of ministries and the social sectors was 
presented as one of their virtues and as a guarantee 
of their flexibility, efficacy and efficiency. In the 
adjustment policies, little consideration was given to 
social aspects; it was thought that trickle-down effects 
would provide the poor with opportunities and, in the 
short term, the social emergency funds would make up 
to some extent for the losses of income of the most 
severely affected sectors. The funds were aimed at job 
creation, the creation of infrastructure in poor areas and 
the provision of monetary transfers. The programmes 
were of an assistentialist nature, and their high visibility 
and demonstration effects played an important role in 
strictly political terms; in Bolivia, the areas of highest 
political risk were selected for the investment of the 
funds’ resources. High political visibility was thus 
obtained, although the small scale of those resources 
and of the coverage of the programmes did not permit 
any anti-cyclical effects to be achieved.
A high priority of the social emergency and 
investment funds was job creation. The jobs created 
were generally on a small scale, of very low quality 
and poorly paid, however, and were, moreover, biased 
against women. As employment was one of the main 
anti-poverty mechanisms used by the funds, this fact 
demonstrates the scant consideration given to the 
special characteristics of poverty in the design of these 
programmes (Berar Awad, 1997).
Rather than ensuring flexibility or efficiency, 
the fact that they were competing with social sectors 
merely increased the administrative fragmentation of 
universal policies, since they increased the number 
of cases of overlaps or duplication, or else they gave 
rise to discontinuities with the dynamics of the social 
sectors. In Bolivia, for example, there were dramatic 
situations where schools or health facilities were built 
without having the human resources or additional 
physical infrastructure needed for their operation.
The institutions associated with the social 
emergency and investment funds therefore raised a 
number of problems, since their links with ministries 
and social sectors were very weak. These funds were 
generally run by autonomous, temporary entities 
which, for example, had more foreign financing or 
whose officials had much higher salaries than those in 
other public institutions. As a result, their continuity 
and replicability were very limited, since the rest of 
the public institutional apparatus did not have such 
resources. Over time, this led to criticisms which, for 
example, pointed out the importance of bringing the 
dynamics of the anti-poverty funds and programmes 
into line with those of the ministries, since the social 
sectors have more infrastructure and provide most of 
the social services (Mesa-Lago, 1993; Cornia, 1999).
Critical and qualified appraisals of the performance 
of the social funds by the institutions which financed 
or supported them are also very interesting. Of the 
varied aspects considered in them, let us take only 
some of those which directly concern the link between 
selective policies and the dynamics of social sectors 
(World Bank, 2002, pp. 34-38). Thus, for example, it 
was found that the funds were seen as competing bodies 
that enjoyed privileges that set them apart from the 
sector dynamics, which gave rise to friction and helped 
to establish the idea that their successes were due 
mainly to their greater resource availability. Although 
mechanisms have been established for ensuring that 
the ministries set aside resources to cover the recurrent 
expenditure connected with the facilities provided by 
the social funds —commitments which are sometimes 
not fulfilled because of budgetary restrictions— the 
investments of those funds often do not fit in with 
solidly based sector policies or public investment 
strategies, and approval of their sub-projects by the 
ministries may become mere rubber stamping.
When the funds have accounted for a substantial 
part of social expenditure, as in Bolivia, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, there have even been reports of some 
institutional impacts which have run counter to social 
sector planning. The eff iciency of their resource 
allocation has also been questioned, and their critics 
claim that they have undermined efforts to improve 
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transparency, accountability and integrated budget 
preparation processes.
With regard to the time horizon of the funds’ 
activities, other analyses have claimed that these 
instruments can dilute or postpone social sector reforms, 
reduce the capacity of the corresponding ministries to 
assign resources on a sector basis, and encourage a bias 
among donors towards investment rather than current 
expenditure, which may affect the quality and results 
of the services offered. It may be seen from the above-
mentioned appraisals how a negative view of universal 
policies and the belief that poverty problems should be 
solved primarily through targeted programmes led to 
a certain relation between selective and social sector 
programmes which, by inhibiting the necessary reforms 
in universal policies, can have a negative effect in the 
medium and long term.
Fortunately, the controversial and radical nature of 
the reductionist approach with regard to targeting led to 
debates —even within the World Bank, mainly at the 
technical level— on its directions and scope. Another 
factor which may have acted in the same direction was 
a certain inflexibility in that organization’s thinking, 
reflected in its World Development Report 1997: the 
State in a Changing World,7 with regard to the link 
between growth and equity and the conception of the 
State and the market.
The global view on social policy characteristic of 
the reductionist slant was gradually eroded by all kinds 
of considerations, of which the following may briefly 
be mentioned (Sojo, 1999):
(i)  Political economy: not only the poor should 
benefit from social policy, since structural 
changes require the support of broader political 
coalitions, which can be aided by a broader 
social policy;
(ii)  Viability: the viability of establishing isolated 
targeted programmes is limited, as in actual 
fact the majority of the selective programmes 
in the region are carried out in the framework 
of the basic social services with which they are 
related;
(iii) The specific national features of poverty: there 
are proposals which recognize that the emphasis 
of macro, sector and targeted policies should be 
a function of the incidence and specific nature of 
the poverty existing in each country. Targeting 
is all the more important when poverty is very 
concentrated and there is good capacity for 
programme execution but, it is asserted, when 
poverty is very widespread and the execution 
capacity is weak, it is best tackled through the 
benefits of growth and support for the basic 
social services;
(iv)  Qualified appraisals of universality: with regard 
to the health sector, for example, it is considered 
that universal policies are progressive when 
there is effective universal coverage and the 
inequalities inherent in multi-level systems 
of financing have been eliminated. It is felt, 
however, that a necessary condition for such 
policies is that the bulk of the labour force 
should have formal employment and that there 
should be the necessary financial resources, 
administrative capacity and political will;
(v) Requirements with regard to the management 
of targeting: in order to be effective, targeting 
needs a certain level of institutions, together 
with technical and financial resources, thus 
weakening the claim that it guarantees the 
reduction of poverty at lower cost;
(vi) On the basis of successful development 
experiences in South-East Asian countries, the 
international financial organizations adopted 
a somewhat more flexible approach to human 
capital which also considers secondary education 
7 World Bank (1997). The development strategy proposed there denies 
that there are trade-offs between growth and equity, and asserts 
instead that there is a complementary relationship between the State 
and the market. The time horizon envisaged is far from the short 
term associated with the adjustment proposals. With regard to basic 
services, the report proposes a flexible position on their provision, 
financing and regulation, depending on the relative strengths of 
the State agencies, the market and civil society. It is cautious with 
regard to market mechanisms, noting that there is no proof that the 
use of vouchers improves performance and that in the contracting 
of services, the products required must be very carefully specified. 
It goes on to observe that such contracting becomes more difficult 
when an absence of competition makes it harder to compare relative 
performance. Unlike the 1980s, poverty is placed in a broader 
framework, and it is envisaged that the functions of the State should 
include the redistribution of assets in order to increase equity. The 
reduction of poverty is related with five crucial ingredients: actions 
must be based on the law; there must be a favourable environment 
for policy-making, including macroeconomic stability; there must be 
investment in persons and infrastructure; and there must be protection 
of the most vulnerable sectors and protection of the environment. A 
rigid distinction between public and private goods, or some degree 
of disdain for the externalities of private goods, however, has 
implications when defining the areas of action of social policy and 
laying down the levels of provision of services in the education and 
health sectors: in the health field, for example, curative treatments are 
defined as an almost exclusively private good, and it is considered 
that if they are not financed by the State, everyone except the poor 
will find some way of financing them (Sojo, 1999). With regard to the 
implications of this latter position in other contexts, see the criticisms 
below of similar positions with regard to social risk management 
and also the comments made in section VI.
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to be important and, with it, interaction between 
the different levels of provision of services;
(vii) The Asian experiences also revitalized the 
international financial organizations’ views on 
the need to improve income distribution for the 
benefit of greater growth and social integration: 
it is claimed that in those countries the smaller 
inequalities in income have had a positive effect 
on growth, both indirectly and directly. Once 
again, this opens up an opportunity to attach 
greater importance to the causes of poverty;
(viii) Conceptions of development which deny that 
there are trade-offs between growth and equity, 
which recognize that there is a complementary 
relationship between the State and the market, 
and which are cautious with regard to market 
mechanisms for reasons of efficiency and equity 
gained ground even within the World Bank.
The questioning of this approach, which arose 
in the mid-1990s and has been growing steadily ever 
since, brought about some changes in the global 
approaches to social policy and targeting, in line with 
national circumstances and the specific features of 
each programme.8 With regard to the main proposals, 
it should be noted that at the beginning of the present 
decade ECLAC put forward five main social policy 
guidelines for the region, namely: universality, solidarity, 
efficiency, equivalence and comprehensiveness. Within 
this framework, selectivity or targeting was conceived 
of as a set of instruments which would make it possible 
to assign subsidized resources to the poorest sectors 
while also fulfilling a complementary function, since 
“… it is not a social policy as such, but rather a method 
which, if properly applied, enhances the effectiveness 
of universal social programmes (ECLAC, 2000, p. 78 
and, in more general terms, pp. 77-84). 
This questioning does not mean that reductionist 
theories in the field of social policy have been put 
aside in general as a suitable proposal for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Indeed, in the late 1990s 
a renovated form of reductionism appeared, this time 
in connection with insurance. Within the context of the 
debate on the region’s level of economic and social risk 
and its insurance markets, it is important to consider 
social risk management,9 which links a certain view of 
insurance policies with global proposals on social policy 
(Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000; World Bank, 2001).
Although the influence of this latter proposal 
on public policy design may be limited by the rather 
hermetic terminology employed, it is worth analysing 
because of its paradigmatic ambitions, in respect not 
only of insurance policies but also of the struggle against 
poverty and the delimitation of social policies, where 
it minimizes the responsibility of society for dealing 
with economic insecurity. Unlike the reductionist 
approach to targeting policies that emerged in the 
wake of structural adjustment, it attaches importance 
to the causes of poverty and makes use of insurance 
terminology (Sojo, 2003, pp. 126-127).
The analysis of social risk management rightly 
points out that all individuals are vulnerable to 
numerous risks of different kinds, and it interrelates 
risk, risk exposure and vulnerability. A risk is an 
event that may damage a person’s welfare and that is 
uncertain as to its duration and the extent of the harm 
it may cause. Exposure is the likelihood of a risk 
occurring. Vulnerability measures resistance to shocks 
and hence the likelihood that such shocks may result in 
a loss of welfare, which is first and foremost a function 
of household asset levels, insurance mechanisms and 
the severity and frequency of the shock concerned. A 
social safety net is defined as a set of public actions that 
help individuals, households and communities to deal 
with risk and that supports the poorest; such actions 
should create mutually supportive relationships with 
education and health sectors in the pursuit of human 
capital development.
Setting out from the subject of risk and insurance, 
however, a comprehensive social policy proposal 
is formulated which provides for a public-private 
combination whose character and delimitations are 
functional to these issues and which is based on three 
8 For example, the existence of a complementary relationship between 
universal and selective policies was established and explicitly put 
forward in the Plan nacional de lucha contra la pobreza. Hacia una 
Costa Rica integrada por las oportunidades (National Anti-poverty 
Plan. Towards a Costa Rica integrated on the basis of opportunities) 
(Government of Costa Rica, Segunda Vicepresidencia, 1996). Up 
to then, reductionist proposals for targeting had not gained much 
ground in that country. It has been asserted, however, that that 
document nevertheless marked a turning-point because it proposed 
that universal and selective social policies should be duly linked, 
it put the question of coordination in the centre of the debate, 
and it presented a 10-point list of the main guidelines in the fight 
against poverty. It also set the framework for the plans of later 
administrations, so that its approach has been present throughout 
the last 10 years (Barahona, 2006, pp. 68 and 69). ECLAC provided 
technical cooperation in the drafting of the plan.
9 The summary and critical analysis of the social risk management 
proposal considered here were taken almost entirely from Sojo, 2003.
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basic elements: the social welfare responsibilities of the 
State are confined to the struggle against poverty; risk 
insurance is designated as an individual responsibility; 
and solidarity in risk diversification is essentially ruled 
out. In these terms, individual insurance in the market, 
the use of safety nets to provide services to the poor, 
and targeting as opposed to universality all go to make 
up a social policy strategy that assigns a minimal role 
to the public sector in social protection, places the 
financing and provision of the remaining social welfare-
related services in private hands and once again rejects 
the principle of solidarity in financing. Thus, an analogy 
can be drawn with the reductionist targeting proposals 
(Sojo, 2003, p. 127).
This proposal sidesteps the fact that it is not 
just when market mechanisms are absent, collapse 
or are dysfunctional that State action or compulsory 
participation in a risk pool is important, since 
information asymmetries and market failures are not 
the exception but are inherent in insurance markets. 
In this respect, public regulation, public insurance, 
or social insurance with private insurers but with 
compulsory financing mechanisms and regulations 
which guarantee risk diversification make it possible 
to tackle risk selection and increase the efficiency 
of these markets by promoting their stability. When 
financing based on solidarity principles is chosen, the 
objectives are also redistributive and it is possible to 
establish cross-subsidies among different income strata, 
age groups, risk groups, etc. Information asymmetries 
and insurance market failures are related with many 
elements, but especially with: adverse selection; forms 
of conduct involving moral hazard; the complexities 
and diff iculties of understanding with which the 
consumer is faced owing to the nature and quality of 
the product —that is to say, all the different types of 
insurance and benefits; the complexity and lack of 
transparency of the product associated with insurance 
(as in the case of health benefits); the externalities of 
consumption; and underconsumption due to an inability 
to pay private insurance premiums because of low 
income or chronic or congenital ailments, in which 
case there is no access to insurance even though the 
market exists (Sojo, 2003, p. 121).
The high level of underconsumption of insurance 
observed in the region does not only affect the poor. 
The pricing system of insurance obtained on the 
market restricts its coverage and amount for very 
extensive sectors of the population, and the limited 
availability of solidary social insurance makes it very 
difficult to narrow the gap between effective income 
levels and the desired levels of insurance. As the 
capacity for risk diversification is affected, the impact 
on well-being is severe and the redistributive effects 




transfer programmes and their
links with social sectors
After the criticisms summarized in the previous section, 
a new phase of targeting was begun in which ground was 
gained by the idea of linking selective programmes with 
social sector policies and programmes, pre-eminently 
of a universal nature, by laying down conditions for 
gaining access to certain benefits, generally monetary. 
Universal benefits, which by their very nature are 
closely associated with social sector dynamics, can 
act as a “hinge” between obligations and rights which 
operates within a broad time spectrum and serves as a 
channel for investment into human capital. The effects 
sought range from the restoration of health to the 
reduction of potential or effective undernourishment 
or improvement of educational backgrounds, so they 
may be visible only in the medium or long term and 
may even be intergenerational. Actions in the field 
of education seek to avoid premature and ultimately 
impaired entry into the labour market.
Although the so-called “Washington consensus” 
was coined in this same period, heterodox anti-poverty 
policies were gradually gaining ground in the 1990s 
because of the erosion of the reductionist proposals 
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on social policy and targeting. Selectivity came to 
be considered less relevant, as it was increasingly 
recognized that the complexity of the objectives of 
social policy went beyond the fight against poverty, 
while the fight against poverty was itself an enormous 
task which went far beyond targeting; that the many-
faceted nature of poverty called for integral yet 
heterogeneous policies and differentiated forms of 
action; and that it was necessary to attack the causes 
of poverty, with emphasis on the acquisition of the 
capacities and skills that will enable people to lift 
themselves out of poverty by participating more fully 
in social, economic and political affairs (Sojo, 1999).
Whether programmes or contributions such as 
cash transfers are of an assistentialist nature or are 
aimed at investment in human capital depends on 
the strategy under which the benefits are provided. It 
is therefore appropriate to analyse the simultaneous 
functions that they can fulfill, such as acting against the 
temporary effects of economic adjustments, bringing 
the target population closer to the supply of education 
and health or integrating it into that supply, and also 
to explore their indirect effects, such as changes in the 
micro-physics of power in households when women 
are the recipients of cash transfers or other types of 
conditional benefits and have to make sure that the 
counterpart obligations are actually fulfilled. Such 
considerations must be borne in mind when analysing 
trends in targeting. The heterodox nature which this 
has gradually taken on, at least in the countries that are 
allocating more resources to it in relative terms, seems 
to have been fostered by the lessons learned from the 
failures and limitations experienced at the height of 
the reductionist wave; it may also reflect the effect of 
some criticisms made at the time by experts on this 
matter (Atkinson, 1995; Sen, 1995).
Conditional income transfer programmes provide 
for counterpart contributions that are mainly related 
with investment in human capital through actions in the 
field of the education, nutrition and the health status 
of children and young people. The aim is to help stop 
students from dropping out from school or lagging 
behind in primary education and to forestall premature 
and/or precarious entry into the labour market. In 
order to carry out this task effectively, other family 
members —especially women— are also involved 
in its performance. When a counterpart requirement 
involves the provision of some form of work, this 
affects the heads of household, in this case through 
employment programmes. Employment programmes 
have been developed both in Bolivia, a country with 
widespread chronic poverty, and in Argentina, where 
considerable increases in poverty rates in recent years 
have been associated with unemployment and declining 
income levels caused by macroeconomic disturbances. 
What is at stake, then, is the existence of the type of 
social sector supply needed to make the fulfilment of 
counterpart requirements viable. In other words, far 
from being in contraposition to one another, the logic 
of the relevant social sectors and the logic of targeted 
policies are actually complementary. At the same time, 
the conditional nature of the benefits means that the 
family must be considered as a whole (Serrano, 2005; 
ECLAC, 2006).10
The institutional implications of this heterodox 
approach include the following:
(i) The need for the coordination of anti-poverty 
policies with macroeconomic policy and production 
development policies11 and their linkage with 
general social policy reforms. The experiences 
of Chile and Brazil are very interesting in this 
respect. In the Chilean case there are links, even 
of a budgetary nature, between the two types of 
policies. The Puente programme, for example, 
transfers resources to ministries so that they can 
serve the needs of given population groups selected 
by the programme. In other words, the Puente 
programme has certain amounts of resources 
which must be invested by, say, the Ministry of 
Education, under the terms of an agreement, on 
the education of certain beneficiaries. 
(ii) The need for the strategic incorporation of 
selectivity as a complement to the existing 
institutions rather than in competition with them. 
Such is the case of the Oportunidades human 
development programme in Mexico or the Bolsa 
Escola (scholarship) programme in Brazil, which 
was later incorporated into a broader programme 
(Bolsa Familia): all these initiatives correspond to 
transfers made from an integral standpoint. The 
fact of laying down rights and obligations for the 
beneficiaries has certain consequences: measures 
must be taken to ensure that beneficiaries can 
make effective use of their rights and obligations. 
In other words, action must be taken to ensure 
that there is effective access to a public supply, 
10 For a synoptic table of the programmes, see the appendix.
11 With regard to the effects of macroeconomic policies and economic 
performance on well-being in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, 
see Sánchez (2005).
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generally of health and education services, when 
some counterpart requirement must be fulfilled by 
beneficiaries. Such a strategic and complementary 
form of incorporation has global repercussions for 
social policy and its institutional domain;
(iii) The need to make sure that the resources allocated 
to these programmes are sustainable.12
It must be repeated that, strictly speaking, 
conditional benefits are not radically new.13 The critical 
point in some conditional cash transfer programmes 
which have had a certain demonstration effect in 
the region —such as the Oportunidades and Bolsa 
Familia programmes— is the number of beneficiaries. 
For example, the Bolsa Familia programme had the 
objective of covering 11.2 million families by the 
year 2006 (Cohn and Medeiros, 2004). Table 1 shows 
the substantial resources and growing coverage of the 
Oportunidades programme in Mexico, while table 2 
shows the modest resources that the Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF) continues to have in Honduras.
The Plan for Heads of Household, introduced 
in Argentina in January 2002, was also on a large 
scale and was aimed at relieving the vulnerability of 
TABLE 2
Honduras: Population served by the
family allowances programme (PRAF)
(Percentages)
Category of Population Number of Population
beneficiaries projected beneficiaries served
 by the National  (%)
 Statistical
 Institute (INE)
Women of childbearing 2 625 399 241 308 9.2
age and children under 6
Children of school 1 158 820 160 872 13.9
age (7-12 years)
Population aged  4 521 886 51 196 1.1
between 3 and 64
Elderly persons (65 292 766 46 666 15.9
years of age or more)
Source: Office of the President of the Republic of Honduras, Family 
Allowances Programme (PRAF).
TABLE 1
Mexico: Scale indicators of the
Oportunidades programme, 2000 and 2006
Level/year 2000 2006
Families 2 470 000 5 000 000
Persons 12 350 000 25 000 000
Primary education 
  scholarships 1 677 138 2 867 760
Secondary education 
  scholarships 808 185 1 734 643
Intermediate and higher 
  education scholarships – 696 353
Elderly persons – 820 000
Rural localities 52 373 87 720
Semi-urban localities 851 2 493
Urban localities 8 500
Municipalities 2 166 2 435
Source: Gómez-Hermosillo (2006).
12 In this connection, the General Social Development Law 
promulgated in 2004 in Mexico is particularly interesting because 
it combines various elements of this heterodox view. One of its 
principles is solidarity, understood as collaboration among persons, 
social groups and levels of government, with shared responsibility, 
to improve the quality of life of society as a whole. The principle 
of integrality, for its part, concerns the linking together and 
complementarity of programmes and actions involving the different 
social benefits under a national social development policy. According 
to articles 14 and 18 of this law, among the main areas of action 
of social development policy are: sector-level actions relating to 
employment, social security and social assistance programmes, 
regional development, basic social infrastructure, and promotion of 
the social sector of the economy. The allocation of expenditure on 
social development is protected; per capita social expenditure cannot 
be less in real terms than it was in the immediately preceding year 
(so that 2004 becomes the base year) and its distribution must be 
based on criteria of efficacy, amount and quality. See SEDESOL 
(2004, section I, pp. 3-14).
13 The early experience of the National Complementary Nutrition 
Programme (PNAC) in Chile was already analysed. Another 
conditional benefits programme introduced at an early stage was the 
Family Allowances Programme (PRAF) in Honduras, which began 
as a combination of several programmes, with weak institutions 
and limited resources. Its benefits, which include food vouchers, 
scholarships, support programmes for microentrepreneurs, integral 
development for women, and mother and child health services, 
were designed to support integration into the educational system 
and access to health. The PRAF was subsequently expanded to cover 
shops offering basic consumer products, communal banks exclusively 
for women, production projects under the subprogramme of integral 
development for women, and vouchers for the elderly (ECLAC, 1998). 
See also table 2 in this respect.
families affected by poverty and unemployment after 
the macroeconomic shocks of 2001. This plan —one 
of the largest of its kind in the region— covered 
nearly two million households at the end of 2000. In 
order to ensure that the beneficiary population really 
was the neediest, beneficiaries were required to work 
as a counterpart obligation. There are evaluations 
which show that compliance with the selection criteria 
(beneficiaries must be unemployed heads of household) 
was not always complete, since some participants, 
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especially women, were not in the labour market before 
the macroeconomic disturbances in question occurred; 
it has been calculated that half the beneficiaries were 
previously inactive, that the Plan helped to bring down 
extreme poverty by 2% and that, without the Plan, 10% 
of the beneficiaries would have lapsed into extreme 
poverty (Galasso and Ravallion, 2003).
If the f inancing and coverage of plans and 
programmes like those described above could be 
brought up to a level proportional to the incidence of 
poverty, they could also have an anti-cyclical effect. The 
rapid increase in scale of some programmes should not 
lead us to over-estimate the overall share of conditional 
cash transfers in social policy resources as a whole or in 
GDP, however (see table 3). Generally, even in Mexico 
or Brazil, the transfers received by beneficiaries are 
low; in the case of the Oportunidades programme, for 
example, the desirability of raising the amount of the 
transfers has been under discussion since 2006.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the efficient 
and timely provision of monetary transfers in accordance 
with the criteria for the selection of beneficiaries poses 
major challenges in terms of management. In this 
respect, it is interesting to look at the processes for 
the regular and stable provision of transfers under the 
Oportunidades programme, which is financed with 
resources from a number of different sources and 
whose ongoing bimonthly operating cycle is adjusted 
according to the updating of the register of beneficiaries 
and the ongoing certification of co-responsibilities. In 
2006 this management scheme entailed calculating 
monetary support for 10.3 million people and following 
up on its delivery with real-time control indicators 
(Gómez-Hermosillo, 2006). In the current discussions 
on the future of the programme, it has been affirmed 
that making cash transfers —which necessarily involves 
an up-to-date selection of beneficiaries— is its core 
function. This affirmation is made with a view to 
avoiding an expansion into service provision functions 
or even into new or additional co-responsibilities, for 
example in the field of insurance (López Calva, 2006; 
Gertler, 2006).
In the case of Brazil, the Bolsa Escola programme 
has begun to make innovations in management 
by eliminating bureaucratic intermediaries and 
transferring resources directly to beneficiaries through 
magnetic cards issued by a public bank with a broad 
national presence. With the passage of time, in the 
context of the Bolsa Familia programme, the bank 
has become the body responsible for managing the 
register of beneficiaries, which it has succeeded in 
consolidating into a single unified register. In Mexico, 
discussions are currently under way on a single unified 
register of beneficiaries of social programmes and a 
beneficiary selection system based on the register of 
the Oportunidades programme and the procedures for 
generating it. 
It is increasingly recognized that programmes 
should address the specific causes of poverty and 
take account of its heterogeneity, which calls for 
integrated but differentiated actions.14 The less tangible 
counterpart of conditional transfers is the institutional 
structure of the various sectors, so such transfers must 
TABLE 3
Latin America (four countries): scale of some
conditional transfer programmes (various years)
Country Programme and year of estimate Beneficiaries Expenditure on
   programme, as a
   percentage of GDP
Brazil Bolsa Familia, 2006 65% of poorest families 0.41a
Chile Chile Solidario, 2004 6.45% of the population 0.10
Colombia Familias en Acción, 2001 4% of the population 0.3
Honduras Family Allowances Programme (PRAF) (see table 2) 0.3b
Source: ECLAC (2006) and the programmes themselves.
a Projections by Afonso, reproduced in Draibe (2006).
b Projections according to preliminary figures of the Central Bank, provided by the PRAF in February 2007.
14 Emphasis had already been placed in the region on the 
heterogeneity of poverty and its consequences for targeting in terms 
of dealing with different kinds of needs, and on its implications 
for the design of programmes and of the criteria and instruments 
for the selection of beneficiaries (Raczynski, 1991; Vergara, 1990; 
ECLAC, 1994).
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not be divorced from those sectors and much less must 
they be in competition with them; the aim is that they 
should contribute to universalization and help people 
to rise out of poverty (Cohn and Medeiros, 2004). The 
interlinking of selective programmes with the existing 
institutions of the sectors is a process which is still 
under way, however, and it will undoubtedly call for 
many adjustments.
In the case of the Chile Solidario social safety 
net, the Puente programme, which seeks to integrate 
the poorest sectors socially by bringing them closer to 
the system of public services, establishes a contract 
with beneficiary families that links the provision of 
services by the State with tasks that they must fulfill, as 
determined by the monitor. This means that the health, 
education, employment and housing sectors, among 
others, specifically undertake to give priority attention 
to these beneficiaries and, when necessary, to strengthen 
their service delivery systems. The local promoters 
of the programme identify the existing systems to 
which families can be directed, and the actions of the 
programme are coordinated at the municipal level. The 
implementation of the Chile Solidario programme has 
led to changes in the government agencies involved 
and in their interrelations. It involves the Ministry 
of Planning and Coordination, which is in charge of 
the programme; the Solidarity and Social Investment 
Fund (FOSIS), which executes the Puente programme 
at the central, regional and municipal levels; and the 
municipal bodies, which, in the case of the Puente 
programme, set up a family action unit under an 
agreement with FOSIS. There has been some friction 
between the Ministry of Planning and FOSIS, as the 
latter organization has taken on the leadership role 
because of its experience in the fight against poverty. 
In order to set in motion a multi-sector network for the 
provision of services it was necessary to sign service 
delivery agreements at the national and regional levels. 
There has also been some tension with municipalities 
over areas of influence, resources and use of the latter 
for political purposes. The promulgation of the law 
governing the Chile Solidario programme made it 
possible to formalize the rules of procedure (Palma 
and Urzúa, 2005).
The Brazilian experience has a very special 
feature, inasmuch as traditional assistentialist-type 
programmes have not formed the nucleus of the fight 
against poverty; instead, this role has been played by 
the new conditional transfer programmes, which have 
not constituted a social safety net because they were 
established by the social ministries which provide 
social services contingent on the transfers. In order 
not to disconnect such programmes from the basic 
universal-type social policy, when more experience 
had been gained and a unified register of beneficiaries 
had been formed, the link was maintained between 
the monetary benefits and the service providers and 
“specialities” of the sector. This form of division is said 
to have generated a very close relationship with service 
providers, especially schools and local health clinics, 
which made it possible to maximize the improvement 
in school or nutritional performance and thus achieve 
a disproportionately strong impact relative to the 
monetary resources received. The respective ministries 
were responsible for monitoring the fulfillment of 
the various obligations concerned. Subsequently, the 
implementation of the Bolsa Familia programme in 
2003, aimed at unifying programme management 
under the Ministry of Social Development, gave 
important functions to the municipalities, while the 
ministries continued to regulate the conditions for 
co-responsibilities and to verify their fulfilment by 
beneficiaries. Some analysts have warned of a risk of 
“prefecturization” – the allocation of greater relative 
power to the municipal prefect, with a consequent 
possibility of clientist distortions – and this has led 
to some reticence on the part of the educational and 
health institutions with respect to the Bolsa Familia 
programme, while it has also been noted that the integral 
and coordinated provision of services which should be 
the responsibility of the service providers is still pending 
(Draibe, 2006, pp. 144, 148, 153 and 173-175).
In evaluations of the Oportunidades programme, it 
has been recommended that it should have more links 
with the traditional operation of the health programmes. 
From the standpoint of beneficiaries, these activities are 
seen as routine measures not linked with the benefits 
provided under the programme. At the local level, the rules 
governing the operation of the Oportunidades programme 
makes it just another programme additional to those of the 
health or education sectors, thus losing the integral nature 
sought for in conditional benefits (Meneses, Almodóvar 
and others, 2005, pp. 358 and 359).
In the debate which has been taking place on the 
Oportunidades programme since 2006, a central place 
is occupied by its links with social sector policies. The 
controversy has been focused on several issues. One 
of them is the effect of the quality of services on the 
stock of human capital which the programme seeks to 
enhance; among the achievements, mention has been 
made of better child health and nutrition, higher rates 
of school attendance, and some improvements in the 
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health of older people. There is concern, however, 
that this will not prevent children from being poor in 
the future, that the design of the incentives does not 
promote a clear transition to secondary education, and 
that little is known of the quality of learning, while in 
the field of health, the rates of obesity, diabetes and 
hypertension are still high. Another problem mentioned 
is that preschool children are not a target population. 
This raises the question of the quality of health care, 
the monitoring of the supply of education in terms 
of quality and coverage, and preschool cognitive 
development —aspects which are in the hands of 
the social sector bodies providing the services— and 
ways in which the Oportunidades programme could 
encourage improvements in the quality of the sector 
supply (Gertler, 2006; Alvarez, 2006).
On the basis of evidence on the quality of the 
education to which beneficiaries have access and on 
the effects of the Oportunidades programme, it has 
been proposed that in order to increase its impact 
it is essential to improve the quality of the social 
sector supply and to seek collateral effects in family 
behaviour: for example, families should be made to see 
that the future benefits of education are higher than the 
benefits they are currently receiving (Parker, 2006). The 
possibility has also been raised that the evaluation of 
the Oportunidades programme should be extended to 
the supply of education and that global action should 
be demanded to improve the supply of education for 
the poorest sectors (Mancera, 2006).
In various experiences, it has been found that 
reconciling the social sector supply with conditional 
benefits requires an expansion of social spending, 
especially on education and health. Thus, it is recognized 
that expanding the coverage of the Oportunidades 
programme in Mexico requires education and health 
services which, for example, will enable the programme 
not only to cover the poorest areas but also to incorporate 
poor families in areas with a low level of marginality 
and a low concentration of poor households (Orozco and 
Hubert, 2005, p.6). A frank analysis and balance-sheet 
on the dynamics of the health and education sectors and 
their coordination with the Oportunidades programme 
concludes that greater consonance of objectives must 
be sought, because at present the links with the 
programme are not known to the sectors involved, those 
objectives are not incorporated in the sectors’ own 
aims, no indicators on their operations or statements 
of accounts are presented by the specific sectors to the 
Oportunidades programme, and there are no effective 
collaboration mechanisms (Hernández, 2006).
In this respect, as has so rightly been noted in 
the analysis of experiences as different as those of 
Chile and Mexico, conditional transfers of income 
are no substitute for the provision of a supply of 
good-quality social services. If there is no concern 
about the importance of providing high-quality health 
and education services, there is a risk of making 
cash transfers conditional on the performance of 
suppliers who are not capable of achieving long-term 
improvements in well-being or of combating the causes 
of poverty and its intergenerational nature. This is why 
it is proposed to expand the coverage of these services 
in poor areas and to take measures to ensure better 
quality of the services provided (Rawlings, 2004, p. 4; 
Serrano and Raczynski, 2003 and 2005).15
In Costa Rica, conditional benefits are currently 
being designed as a function of social sector dynamics, 
so that they can act as bridges that can give the poor 
access to universal services. Thus, the conditional 
transfer programmes are designed to help combat 
low coverage and high drop-out rates in secondary 
education, which mainly affect poor young people.16 
The commitments of families will therefore not be 
centred on access to health services, which already have 
a very high level of coverage in the country (Zumbado, 
2006, pp. 13 and 14).
In order for the conjunction between social 
sectors and selective levels to be viable, it is very 
often necessary to modify the way in which benefits 
have been delivered in the past. An improvement in the 
quality of services, for example, not only contrasts with 
the allocation of more resources in order to achieve 
the same objective but also means modifying the 
way services are organized, the applicable rules and 
incentives, and also the evaluation of resource use. Such 
15 This view is not shared by some analysts, however. Some of 
them propose, for example, that in order to make resource use more 
efficient, benefits should involve the transportation of schoolchildren 
to areas where suitable educational services are available; along 
the same lines, transport subsidies for travel to areas with a good 
supply of educational services are considered to be efficient. On the 
other hand, it is considered inefficient to use transfers to achieve 
higher school attendance rates in places where, simply because 
an educational supply exists, there is a high propensity to attend 
school, regardless of whether there is monetary support for doing 
so (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005). This approach reflects some 
disdain for efforts to expand sector coverage, in this case in the 
field of education, although these efforts, which obviously require 
the allocation of more resources for social expenditure, are made for 
the benefit of greater equity and should not be subject to reductionist 
considerations of efficiency.
16 The challenges currently facing education in Costa Rica are 
analysed in Garnier (2007).
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changes are not as popular as expansions of coverage 
based fundamentally on an increase in resources, 
because as accounts are demanded on the use made of 
those resources, difficulties of a political nature may 
arise. These difficulties occur because, although there 
is only scattered support for reforms of this type on the 
part of those who benefit from them, there are well-
organized opponents of the reforms, because the latter 
change the incentives or rules (Grindle, 2004). It must 
therefore be clearly appreciated that improving benefits 
and establishing a suitable link between social sectors 
and selective levels has strong political connotations if 
any attempt is made to modify the existing institutions 
in order to improve the quality and equity of services. 
This means linking financial control, for example, with 
service performance, making the institutions render 
accounts, and having an integral view of aspects which 
have previously operated in watertight compartments. 
The political viability of such measures may run into 
serious obstacles because of the resistance of those 
who had hitherto been providing the services in a 
certain way.
With regard to the sector level, there has been 
controversy in Mexico over a transfer recently 
established by the Oportunidades programme which 
takes the form of a social assistance pension,17 and 
even over the link with health insurance provided 
by the Seguro Popular (People’s Health Insurance) 
(IDB, 2006).18 It has been asserted that first of all it 
would be desirable to consolidate the links with the 
established benefits in the field of primary health care 
and education (Gertler, 2006).
In this case, the most important aspect is concerned 
rather with the architecture of the social protection 
system —which has so far been of a dual nature in 
the sense of the contributory and non-contributory 
protection of the formal and informal sectors— both 
because of its repercussions and because of the 
significance that this type of cash transfer has within 
the non-contributory financing of social protection in 
the form of pensions (IDB, 2006; Levy, 2006).19 Such 
concern is the antithesis of the policies applied in 
Chile under the military dictatorship, when targeting 
was ancillary to the introduction of dual health and 
pension systems. In the case of Mexico, in contrast, 
a discussion is currently under way about whether the 
effort to combat poverty can affect the scope and nature 
of social security and about the possibility that anti-
poverty initiatives may serve as a means of helping to 
overcome its duality.20
If we place the elements of this controversy in a 
more general perspective on conditional transfers, it may 
be seen that coordination with the social sector level is 
more complex when it involves benefits —for example, 
in health and education, for the reasons of coverage 
and supply already analysed— which are intended to 
have effects on human capital accumulation. Pensions, 
which are, strictly speaking, monetary transfers, 
are a different type of case, since the complexity 
of their management has to do with the collection 
of contributions, the processes of delivery, and 
possible counterpart requirements and their respective 
certification. In terms of social policy, it depends on 
the architecture of the pension system.
Conditional transfers form part of the decentralization 
processes under way in the region. The municipalities 
participate in the selection of beneficiaries, in verification 
of fulfillment of the relevant counterpart requirements, 
and in the management of monetary transfers, which can 
lead to appreciable variations on those levels (de Janvry, 
Finan and others, 2005, p. 3), to different associations 
between the central government and the decentralized 
levels, and to effects on the local economies. In 
December 2003, transfers under the Bolsa Familia 
programme represented 15% of the resources of the 
Municipal Participation Fund in the northern region 
of Brazil, 28% in the north-east region, 10% for the 
south-east, 8% for the south and 7% for the centre-west 
17 The “Oportunidades” retirement saving mechanism (mecanismo 
de ahorro para el retiro (MAROP)).
18 It has been proposed, for example, that the “Oportunidades” 
programme should not provide benefits conditional upon the 
employment status of the beneficiary families. In this respect, in 
order to promote formal employment “it is a question of bringing 
incentives into line”, while with regard to pensions, it has been 
proposed that the MAROP should be eliminated and that consideration 
should be given instead to a coherent social security system with, 
for example, a non-contributory solidary pillar (IDB, 2006, p. 16), 
which is in keeping with the proposals of Levy (2006). In this context, 
the MAROP is being redefined in order to make it “portable” and 
complementary (Gómez-Hermosillo, 2006).
19 With regard to the recent political difficulties experienced in 
Mexico in reforming social protection in the field of health, linked 
with that of pensions, see González (2005) and a summary version 
of that study in Sojo and Uthoff (2007).
20 For a valuable analysis on forms of financing for non-contributory 
pensions in Costa Rica, taking into account economic growth, fiscal 
viability and different actuarial scenarios, see Durán (2007). Likewise, 
for a study of the reforms under way in the Chilean pension system, 
which go beyond an assistentialist view and modify the architecture 
of the sector to give it greater solidarity, see Uthoff (2007).
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region; this breakdown demonstrates their interregional 
redistributive impact (Cohn and Medeiros, 2004).
A more flexible discourse may also be observed 
with regard to the public-private mix in the provision 
of targeted services, since there is greater recognition 
that no aspect of benefits and their impact —quality, 
efficacy, efficiency or equity— is guaranteed simply 
by the public or private nature of the benefit. This 
is the case both with respect to the expansion of 
benefits provided by private entities, as in the case 
of the Seguro Popular programme in Mexico (Sojo, 
2006), and in relation to the need to refrain from 
demonizing the State further in its role as a benefit 
provider while recognizing the market failures and 
asymmetries which lead to exclusion of high-risk and 
low-income sectors.
It is also necessary to analyse and control the 
occurrence of perverse incentives. For both parents 
and teachers, for example, educational allowances 
may, paradoxically, foster the repetition of grades in 
certain rural areas where the barriers to the continuity 
of education interact with the conditions of access to 
those allowances. Here, once again, is an aspect which 
highlights the need for synergy between the reform of 
social sectors and targeted programmes, in this case 
through the elimination of barriers to the continuity 




effort to combat poverty
Guaranteed health benefits are selective policies, 
although they differ from anti-poverty policies because 
of their broader purposes and the vertical coverage they 
may involve: that is to say, the types of benefits they 
offer. In some cases, such as those of Guatemala or 
Bolivia, however, these guarantees may be subsumed 
in anti-poverty policies because their beneficiaries 
are poor.21 This is not so in the case of the Seguro 
Popular programme in Mexico, which, although 
primarily aimed at the poor who are excluded from 
other insurance systems, permits other income strata 
to join and covers some high-cost services. Nor is it 
the case of the Explicit Health Guarantees (garantías 
explícitas en salud (GES)) programme in Chile, given 
the types of benefits and the income sectors that benefit. 
This represents a step forward towards greater effective 
universality in health.
It should be recalled that the objectives and 
instruments of social policy reflect an agreement 
on the socially desirable level of well-being and the 
best ways of attaining it, which may ultimately be 
expressed through the formulation of social rights. In 
this sense, from the legal standpoint the guarantees are 
suitable means of ensuring the efficacy of the laws that 
recognize these rights. In the case of property rights 
and the right to freedom, for example, their enjoyment 
is clearly established by guarantees. Social rights, in 
contrast, generally lack a suitable system of guarantees 
which are comparable with the above rights in their 
capacity for regulation and control. Consequently, the 
development of social rights, even in the European 
Welfare States, has taken place largely through the 
expansion of the discretionality of the bureaucratic 
machinery. Even when social rights and their content 
are identified (a situation which is far from being the 
rule in the region), in order to determine the potential 
scope of their protection it is necessary to establish tools 
that ensure that they can be made effective. Guarantees 
of rights are therefore the methods, mechanisms or 
arrangements which serve to ensure that a right can be 
effectively exercised. In the final analysis, guarantees 
are instruments to ensure that rights are not just a dead 
letter but can instead be demanded, can operate, and 
can be executed (Ferrajoli, 2002; Courtis, 2007).
The lack of such guarantees is a factor that may 
make these rights ineffective. In this sense, the absence 
of suitable social guarantees may lead to bureaucratic 
practices typical of an assistentialist State that tend to 
benefit political clients, which provides fertile ground 
for corruption and arbitrary decisions. Some recent 
social policy reforms, such as charters of users’ rights, 
therefore complement the legal guarantees backing 21 This section is based on Sojo (2006).
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up those rights. Guaranteed health benefits may be 
analysed precisely from this perspective. Each of them 
has been determined along lines appropriate to the 
health system in which they operate and in line with 
the political restrictions encountered, and all of them 
still face unsolved challenges.
In countries with poorly developed health systems, 
with very low levels of insurance of benefits for the 
poorer sectors of the population and with polarized 
processes of epidemiological transition, the guaranteeing 
of benefits has been aimed above all at ensuring primary 
health and mother and child care. Although these 
benefits are relatively inexpensive, they nevertheless 
represent an effort to move forward from the initial 
starting point. In countries like this, guarantees of 
benefits have a very limited effect as regards the 
overall reorganization of the health system. In the 
case of Guatemala, the initially proposed separation of 
functions has been set aside. In Guatemala and Bolivia, 
guarantees are provided as part of a package of benefits, 
but no specific guarantees regarding timely attention 
or access are provided, and they have no repercussions 
on the health insurance architecture.
The system of guaranteed health benefits in 
Chile is the most advanced in the region, since the 
guaranteed benefits introduced in 2005 cover some 
high-cost benefits and include guarantees of timeliness, 
access, financial protection and quality. It also has 
some repercussions on combined public-private health 
care because it partially addresses the basic duality of 
the insurance system, limiting the adverse selection 
practices of private health insurance institutions 
(ISAPREs) and increasing the transparency of the 
coverage offered by them. The progress made in these 
reforms bears witness to the political difficulties which 
have prevented the adoption of measures that would 
have given greater solidarity to the dual insurance 
system, such as the introduction of a solidarity fund. 
The effective fulfillment of the guarantees involves 
great challenges: up to July 2006, two million 
persons had been provided with services. Of the total 
complaints of non-fulfilment presented, 367 concerned 
guaranteed access, and 475 concerned the guarantee 
of timeliness. An evident need has arisen to improve 
the management of the system in order to provide, 
inter alia, a system of early warning and detection of 
shortcomings and to adapt the health service networks 
to users’ needs.22
In Mexico, with the aim of progressing towards 
universal coverage, guaranteed benefits were introduced 
through a reform in the insurance system, without, 
however, altering its segmentation. In order to limit the 
expenses faced by households in catastrophic health 
situations, a new form of insurance was added, with 
new resources, which has some links with the rest of 
the service suppliers but not in the financial field. The 
complexity of financing is noteworthy, due not only to 
the diversity of the funds used to finance the Seguro 
Popular programme but also to the different financial 
mechanisms associated with them. The reform has 
brought changes in the public-private mix, since it 
has increased the share of private service providers. 
Unlike Chile, the coverage is not strengthened with 
additional guarantees.
In all these cases, selectivity occurs throughout 
the range of benefits covered. In institutional terms, the 
logic that is in operation here is eminently sectoral in 
nature and entails a way of organizing providers that 
is in line with the special features of that logic: basic 
health-care teams operating through various public-
private mixes of suppliers under different systems of 
national and sector decentralization.
VII
Conclusions
In short, it has been found that as regards targeting, 
there are no orientations that are divorced from social 
sector dynamics, since they involve synergies or 
competitive relationships. The four landmarks identified 
here in the evolution of selective policies show that over 
the last four decades targeting policies which aim to 
overcome the causes of poverty, or which only address 
its symptoms, have had repercussions on the dynamics 
of social sectors. Reductionist targeting has had a 
subordinate function with respect to sector reforms 
22 The cases of premature births which have had to be treated have 
been more numerous than expected, for example (Urriola, 2006).
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aimed at dismantling or weakening universal policies. 
At the other extreme, when the aim is to get away 
from an assistentialist approach in combating poverty, 
social sector reforms are required which seek to expand 
coverage and improve the quality of benefits.
This study has also addressed two trends in 
targeting in fields which go beyond the fight against 
poverty in its strict sense. On the one hand, there 
is the likewise reductionist proposal for social risk 
management, developed for the field of insurance, which 
undermines the principle of solidarity, underestimates 
the problems of equity deriving from market-based 
insurance, and drastically reduces the social policy 
domain. On the other, and in the opposite direction, 
there is the proposal for guaranteed health benefits, 
which represents policies of a selective nature with 
broader purposes and which in some cases involves 
high-cost benefits, a more vigorous health sector, and 
a form of regulation of the public-private mix that 
upholds the principle of solidarity. Both these trends 
have repercussions at the sector level.
(Original: Spanish)
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To combat hunger, poverty and other forms 
of family deprivation and to promote food 
and nutritional security and access to 
systems of public health, education and 
social assistance by creating possibilities for 
the sustainable emancipation of families and 
local territorial development
To improve the educational performance 
of poor children of school age. To reduce 
present and future poverty
To eradicate child labour, improve 
educational performance and reduce 
poverty
To reduce nutritional deficiencies and child 
mortality
To help strengthen the human, physical 
and social capital of persons, families and 
communities living at risk and in poverty
To provide support to families with 
dependants which have lost their source 
of income
To increase investment in human capital 
in extremely poor families. To act as a 
“safety net”
To increase the accumulation of human 
capital in the children of the poorest 
families, thus helping to break the circle 
of poverty
To promote human capital development 
by improving the educational and health 
levels and nutritional status of children and 
their mothers
To improve the living conditions of extremely 
poor families by generating opportunities 
and providing resources that make it 
possible to recover or obtain the capacity 
to function and take decisions effectively 
in the personal, family, community and 
institutional environments
To reduce the impact of loss of employment 
in the poorest sectors of the population by 
providing large-scale temporary employment 
in urban and rural areas, financing the wages 
of unemployed persons who carry out 
maintenance activities and small projects 
for the common good
To promote the accumulation of human 
capital in extremely poor households
Bolsa Familia and  2003
Fome Zero, Brazil
Bolsa Escola, Brazil 2001
Child Labour  1998
Eradication Programme
(PETI), Brazil 
Bolsa Alimentação,  2000
Brazil
Human Development  2003
Allowance, Ecuador
Heads of Household  2001
Programme, 
Argentina







Chile Solidario  2002
programme, Chile
National Emergency  2001
Employment Plan 
(PLANE), Bolivia
Social Safety Net,  2000
Nicaragua
Income transfers
Scholarships for poor children between 
6 and 15 who attend school
Income transfers; After-school 
programmes
Health grants
Monthly income transfer of 15 dollars
Transfer of 150 Argentine pesos per 
month
Food subsidy for families with children 
under 7; educational subsidy for families 
with children between 7 and 17 who are 
attending school
Educational allowance and nutritional 
and health allowance; training in 
nutrition for mothers; supply incentives 
for primary schools and health centres
Income transfer, educational support, 
and a food package
Income transfers that go down with 
time
Income transfer
Food allowance for the purchase of 
food. 
Educational allowance for households 
with children between 6 and 13. Every 
two months, beneficiaries are given 0.7 
dollars per enrolled child, which must 
be passed on to the school
Following up the health and nutritional 
status of children; enrolment and school 
attendance of all children of school age; 
participation in nutritional education 
actions.
At least 85% school attendance over 
3-month periods
At least 80% school attendance over 
3-month periods and participation in 
the after-school programme (extended 
school day)
Completion of a calendar of visits to 
a health centre and fulfillment of the 
vaccination programme
Enrolment and attendance of children 
at school; attendance at health controls; 
participation in talks in connection with 
the programmes
Counterpart requirements in the form 
of work
Regular visits to health centres to 
monitor the development of children; 
at least 80% school attendance over 
2-month periods
Enrolment in school and a maximum 
of 7 days of absences over a 3-month 
period; fulfillment of regular visits to 
health centres
Attendance at more than 85% of 
classes; participation in educational 
talks under the programme; attendance 
at scheduled visits to health services
School attendance and health controls; 
other family responsibilities
Counterpart requirements in the form 
of work
Enrolment and attendance at school; 
participation in educational talks given 
under the programme
APPENDIX
Latin America: conditional income transfer
and social benefit programmes
Programme  Starting Objective Benefits Requisites for receiving benefits
and country year
Source: Prepared by Serrano (2005), table 2.
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